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Abstract
We show that contract-intensive industries grow disproportionately faster both
in countries with a high initial level of nancial development and in the US states
which deregulated their banking sector. These industries use a high share of
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c inputs that can be purchased only via specic contracts with
the suppliers. Accordingly, both rms in those industries and their suppliers face
above-average levels of risk and transaction costs. Our empirical results thus con-
rm the theoretical claim that nance promotes the real economy via managing
risk and decreasing transaction costs. Furthermore, the pro-growth e¤ect of -
nance seems to come from nancial intermediaries like banks rather than from
stock markets. This suggests that the intrinsic functions of relationship-banking
(long-term commitment, increase in reputation and planning horizon of the bor-
rowers) are especially important for the contract-intensive industries.
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1 Introduction
The incomplete contracts literature shows that a rational agent tends to underinvest
in relationship-specic assets due to the possibility of an opportunistic behaviour from
her contractual partner. This paper provides evidence that a strong banking sector
can alleviate the adverse economic consequences of this well-known holdup problem by
stimulating relationship-specic investment. Our work thus establishes a novel channel
through which nance a¤ects the real economy and promotes long-run growth. It also
complements the existing literature on economic specicity that has stressed legally
binding contracts as a standard solution to the holdup problem.
The distinguishing feature of the relationship-specic assets is the fact that their
value is greater within a relationship than outside it. A typical example would involve an
upstream supplier who makes investments in order to customize her product for the needs
of the downstream purchaser. After the investment is made, the buyer can refuse to
meet her commitment and trigger an ex post re-negotiation. Due to this holdup problem
individually rational sellers will underinvest into relationship-specic assets, hurting the
downstream rms with negative ramications for aggregate growth. In theory, the
producer of the nal good could agree to sign a detailed and enforceable contract and
thereby stimulate the supplier to undertake the optimal level of relationship-specic
investment. In reality, even the most comprehensive contract remains incomplete as it
cannot incorporate all possible states of world.1
Consequently, legally binding contracts only o¤er an imperfect remedy against the
risk of opportunism associated with relationship-specic investment. Furthermore, the
transaction costs of production increase due to negotiating of sophisticated contracts, not
to mention the costs of possible legal enforcement. At this point nancial development
comes into play. After all, the management of risk and the decrease of transaction
costs both belong to the main functions of nance (Levine 2005). There are also several
reasons to expect a preeminent role of banking sector (as opposed to anonymous stock
markets) in stimulating relationship-specic investment by the upstream rms.
1The seminal papers on incomplete contracts, relationship-specic investments and the associated
holdup problem include Klein et al. (1978), Williamson (1979), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart
and Moore (1990). Hart (1995) provides an intuitive introduction to this literature. Caballero and
Hammour (1998) is an early work about macroeconomic consequences of relationship specicity and
incomplete contracts.
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First, even in countries with a highly e¤ective legal system, the way through courts
can involve signicant costs with no guarantee of success. Banks routinely provide
specialized products alongside the loans. These nancial instruments (e.g. letters of
credit) often present a convenient alternative to the cumbersome route of complicated
contracts and their legal enforcement. Furthermore, the remunerative character of such
accompanying products gives the banks the incentive to acquire deep knowledge about
the specic industry in order to better ne-tune its services (Boot and Thakor 2000).
In this context, one could also view bank loans as contracts that explicitly or implicitly
include relationship-specic investment and long-term commitment between the bank
and the client (Boot 2000, Ongena and Smith 1998). Accordingly, several authors (Boot
et al. 1993, Rajan 1998, Rajan 2005) argued that the main comparative advantage of
banks over public markets or even the very reason for their existence lies in the ability
to o¤er incomplete (or discrete) contracts. This makes banks especially qualied to
understand the needs of the industries distinguished by the high share of incomplete
contracts with their suppliers and o¤er an appropriate service for them. Tellingly, the
seminal work on the macroeconomic implications of relationship-specic assets mentions
in the rst paragraph the bank credits and investments of the upstream rms as two
examples of economic specicity (Caballero and Hammour 1998, p. 725).
Second, there is always a residual risk of a vis major holdup due to unexpected
economic problems of the buyer. Equipped with detailed written contracts and operating
in country with superior legal enforcement, suppliers will still face the risk of buyers
unable to meet their nancial commitments. Obtaining a bank loan is a particularly
suitable way to signal creditworthiness to business partners (Fama 1985). Bank loans
have often low priority among the contracts promising xed payo¤s. The renewal process
of short-term bank loans thus implies a regular assessment of the borrowers ability to
meet such contracts and signals the reliability of the borrower.2
Third, the credit lines can overcome the short-term bias in investment and lengthen
the rmsplanning horizon. A rm dependent on external nance may undertake short-
term investments which yield lower long-run returns, but minimize the risk of early
termination by outside investors. Von Thadden (1995) shows how a monitoring contract
2The other agents with xed payo¤s (e.g. suppliers) consider those signals to be credible, as the
bank backs them with its own resources. The value of such signals can be seen in the fact that many
rms pay monitoring fees for lines of credit without e¤ectively taking the o¤ered resources (Fama 1985,
p. 37).
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closely resembling a standard bank-rm lending relationship can help to overcome this
myopia problem. This can be decisive in order to induce relationship-specic investment.
A rm undertaking such investment needs both to dispose of long-term planning horizon
itself and to have business partners that shun myopic behaviour.
Consequently, a well-developed nancial (especially banking) system should dispro-
portionately boost industries dependent on the willingness of their business partners to
undertake relationship-specic investments. Even in a country with superior institutions
and perfect contract enforcement, suppliers will still value good reputation, long-term
planning horizon and nancial stability of the purchasers. The current nancial crisis
made this point painfully clear. The most e¤ective contract enforcement might fail to
protect the suppliers in tough times when the buyer lacks access to a reliable source of
nancing. To give a specic example, no level of institutional quality can protect the
manufacturers of car parts intended for the big U.S. car companies. Only the nancial
stabilization of their troubled customers would do the trick.
We conrm our theoretical prediction by attesting that industries dependent on
relationship-specic investments from their suppliers grow faster in countries with a high
initial level of nancial development. Furthermore, we provide evidence that this e¤ect
comes from a more developed banking sector rather than from a deeper stock market.
Consistent with the outlined theoretical arguments of Fama (1985) and von Thadden
(1995), our channel works mostly via increased entry of new rms (extensive margin) and
higher capital accumulation. New rms especially need to signal their creditworthiness in
order to stimulate relationship-specic investment from their business partners. Existing
rms have already established a reputation with the suppliers and depend less on the
signals from third parties like banks. Similarly, the attenuated short-term investment
bias and increased planning horizon should a¤ect the sectoral output growth primarily
via the higher capital accumulation of rms. For our nal test we turn to the process
of bank deregulation in the USA.3 Conditional on the quality of state court system,
the bank deregulation benets disproportionately the industries requiring relationship-
specic investments from their suppliers.
3This is a unique natural experiment as it occurred in di¤erent states at di¤erent points in time.
In their seminal paper, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) show that GDP growth, in an average U.S.
state, accelerates after relaxing restrictions on intrastate bank entry and expansion. To the extent that
deregulation leads to a more competitive and e¢ cient banking industry, this result provides support
for the existence of a causal link between nance and economic growth.
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This paper combines insights from several strands of literature and makes three
main contributions. First, it provides evidence for a novel channel through which -
nance a¤ects the real economy. Since the seminal work of Rajan and Zingales (1998),
the nance-growth literature has placed special emphasis on the role of nancial de-
velopment in relaxing the credit constraints in the real economy. In our story a well-
developed banking sector reassures the suppliers that hesitate to undertake irreversible
relationship-specic investments.
Second, our paper complements the existing literature on economic specicity that
has stressed comprehensive and enforceable contracts as a (partial) solution to the
holdup problem. Such legal solution to an economic problem implies a prominent role
for institutional quality, an idea pursued in the recent literature on trade and incomplete
contracts. Levchenko (2007) and Nunn (2007) demonstrate a stronger export perfor-
mance of the contract-intensive industries in countries with good institutions, especially
in the form of e¤ective contract enforcement. This paper shows that the domestic -
nancial system plays an autonomous and equally important role in reducing the costs
associated with incomplete contracts and holdup problem.
Finally, the last part of the paper contributes to the literature documenting the
acceleration in growth rates of the U.S. states after they deregulated their banking
system. The main argument contesting the positive e¤ects of this process sees the
increased competition and resulting consolidation among banks as an obstacle for the
rms relying on relationship lending. The theoretical and empirical work on this issue
has focused on the e¤ects of U.S. bank deregulation on small and/or new enterprises
that traditionally depend on relationship banking.4 By looking at the contract-intensive
industries our paper examines an alternative set of bank-dependent rms and provides
some evidence in favour of a competitive banking sector.
4Black and Strahan (2002) provide a good overview of the controversy regarding the e¤ects of bank
consolidation on relationship lending.
5
2 Methodology and Data
2.1 Empirical Model
Our empirical model is based on the methodology introduced by Rajan and Zingales
(1998) and then extensively used in the empirical literature examining the e¤ects of
nance on economic growth. In their seminal contribution, Rajan and Zingales handle
the endogeneity issue which could not be solved in a satisfactory way by previous cross-
country growth studies. The question whether nancial development promotes growth
or merely follows the real economy goes back at least to Schumpeter (1912) and Robinson
(1952) and might be the crucial one in the whole nance-growth literature. One way
to establish the direction of causality is to verify a specic theoretical channel through
which nance promotes economic growth. Rajan and Zingales (1998) focus on the role of
nancial development in relaxing the credit constraints of the rms. First they identify
industries not generating enough cash-ow and thus dependent on external nance.
Then they show that those industries indeed prot from nancial development more
than the others.
Our channel examines the role of nancial development in stimulating the investment
into relationship-specic assets. Specically, we estimate the following equation:
Gic = + FDc0  CIi + Xic + i + c + "ic (1)
where the subscript c and i indicates country and industry respectively and the
subscript 0 indicates beginning of the period variables. As a dependent variable we use
several proxies for industrial growth: average growth of output, average growth of the
number of establishments, average growth of output per establishment, average growth
of employment, average growth of the capital stock and average growth of TFP. Our
variable of interest is CIi  FDc0 , where FDc0 is the initial nancial development in
country c and CIi is the contract intensity measure introduced by Nunn (2007), which
quanties the importance of relationship-specic inputs for di¤erent industries. Xic is a
vector of controls and i and c are industry and country dummies that take care of a
wide range of omitted variables.
A positive estimated coe¢ cient for our variable of interest, CIi  FDc0, would in-
dicate that nancial development benets especially the industries dependent on the
relationship-specic investment of their suppliers. This would be consistent with the
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notion that a nancial system can reassure those suppliers by providing the buyers with
good reputation, long-term planning horizon and nancial stability. In order to account
for alternative channels that might be correlated with our mechanism, we include several
interactions between various country and industry characteristics into our set of control
variables. We also put the initial share of the sector in total output into all regressions
to control for the convergence e¤ect.
It is important to emphasize that the industry characteristic CIi is computed solely
from U.S. industrial data. This approach is based on two assumptions. First, assuming
that U.S. markets are well functioning and (relatively) frictionless, equilibrium variables
in the United States can be taken as good proxies for exogenous technological charac-
teristics of the production process in a given industry. Second, as long as the relative
ranking of industry characteristics are the same across countries, the technological char-
acteristics of the U.S. industries are representative of technologies used in the other
countries. Under these assumptions we can interpret the estimated coe¢ cients for the
interactions of country and industry characteristics in a causal way.
Another crucial point in this econometric approach is the potential endogeneity of
country characteristics like nancial development. We use two di¤erent approaches to
tackle this issue. First, we employ instrumental variable estimation. Second, we leave
the cross-country framework and make use of a natural experiment in the form of branch
deregulation in the United States.
In the instrumental variable approach we follow the nance-growth literature and
use countrieslegal origins as instruments. La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) show that the
origin of a legal system is a strong predictor of the nancial development in a given
country. We instrument the interaction terms of nancial development and industry
characteristics (importance of relationship-specic inputs and dependence on external
nance) by the interaction terms of the latter variables with legal origin dummies.5
Our database has a complex structure with both country and industry dimensions
where heteroskedasticity might be present. If this is the case, the GMM estimator is
more e¢ cient than the simple IV estimator. In the absence of heteroskedasticity the
GMM estimator is asymptotically not worse than the IV estimator.6 However, the
5We run also estimation with malaria risk from Sachs and Malaney (2002) as additional instrument.
The results are qualitatively the same.
6Baum et al. (2003) discuss the advantages of using GMM over 2SLS in the presence of heteroskedas-
ticity in the error term.
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optimal weighting matrix that is used in the e¢ cient GMM procedure is a function of
fourth moments. Obtaining reasonable estimate of fourth moments requires large sample
size. As a result, the e¢ cient GMM estimator can have poor small sample properties.
If in fact the error is homoskedastic, IV would be preferable to e¢ cient GMM in small
sample. Even though our sample has moderate size, we perform the heteroskedasticity
test proposed by Pagan and Hall (1983). In our main specication we reject the null
hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity at 1% level. Therefore we rely on GMM estimation
for our analysis. 7
The quasi-experimental approach o¤ers another way to tackle the endogeneity in the
nance-growth relationship. Starting with Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), an inuential
body of literature uses the process of branch deregulation in the United States in order
to establish the causality link from nance to the real economy. Before the 1970s,
commercial banks in most of the U.S. states were limited in the geographical scope of the
operations even within the state borders. In the 1970s the process of deregulation started
in many states by removing rst the restrictions on intrastate branching via merging and
acquisition followed by the elimination of the overall restriction on intrastate branching.8
The staggered timing of state-level actions to remove branching restrictions creates an
ideal framework to test empirically how these regulatory changes a¤ect the banking
sector and ultimately the real economy. It also allows to exploit variations across states
and time of the growth rates of output to evaluate the e¤ect of the deregulation on the
specic industries.
We construct a dummy variable equal to one after a state permits intrastate branch-
ing via merging and acquisition and zero otherwise.9 The growth e¤ects of deregulation
on contract-intensive industries are estimated using the following specication:
Gist = + 1Deregst + 2Deregst  CIi + Xist + i +4+ "ist (2)
where Gist is output growth for industry i in state s at time t, Deregst is the dummy
for branch deregulation in state s at time t, CIi is the contract intensity measure, Xist is
a vector of controls that includes initial industry share in total state (manufacturing)
7We get very similar results using 2SLS estimation.
8For a review of this literature see Strahan (2003).
9Following the literature we drop the year of deregulation from our estimation and observations for
South Dakota and Delaware. Those states have a unique history related to credit card business which
could lead to biased estimates (see e.g. Strahan 2003).
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output and the growth rate of gross state product. The specication also contains a
set of xed e¤ects 4. Equation (2) is a generalization of the di¤erence in di¤erence
approach where the e¤ect of deregulation is estimated as the di¤erence between the
change in growth of contract-intensive industries before and after deregulation with the
di¤erence in growth rate for a control group of industries before and after deregulation.
Analogously to equation 1, a positive coe¢ cient 2 would imply that bank deregula-
tion disproportionately benets industries requiring a high share of relationship-specic
inputs.
The U.S. framework also allows for a deeper examination of the possible interac-
tions between our channel and the institutional mechanism implied by the incomplete
contracts literature. Financial development and the quality of the legal system can act
as substitutes or complements in stimulating relationship-specic investments. On the
one hand, suppliers might weight the e¢ ciency of the legal system against the nancial
stability of their customers when deciding on the level of their relationship-specic ex-
posure. On the other hand, bank products eligible for reassuring those suppliers often
require at least some level of legal quality. The relative importance of these e¤ects will
vary from country to country, depending on the level of development and other (possi-
bly non-observable) country-specic characteristics. It is therefore more appropriate to
test this issue within the sample of the U.S. states rather than in a broad cross-country
context.
We augment equation 2 by adding two interaction terms:
Gist = +1Deregst+2DeregstCIi+3CourtssCIi+4DeregstCourtssCIi+Xist+i+4+"ist
(3)
where Courtss is a measure for the quality of state courts whose direct e¤ect is
captured by the state xed e¤ects. A positive estimated coe¢ cient 4 would suggest that
the legal system and bank deregulation act as complements in promoting relationship-
specic investment. This, assuming that 2 and 3 turn out to be positive as well.
A negative coe¢ cient for the triple interaction term would indicate substitutability
between the two channels maintaining relationship-specic assets. Crucially, any of
these results would apply only to countries sharing similar institutional, economic and
nancial structures with the United States.
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2.2 Data
2.2.1 International Sample
The international industry-level data come from the Trade, Production, and Protection
Database by Nicita and Olarreaga (2007) that has data on production for up to 100
countries over the period 1976 to 2004. The production data in this database come from
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and are reported
according to the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 classication. We transform data in current
U.S. dollars into constant international dollars using capital and GDP deator from
Penn World Table (Heston, Summers, and Aten, 2002). The resulting sample includes
data for 28 manufacturing industries in 91 countries for the period between 1980 and
2004. The list of the countries used in our sample is reported in Appendix A.
We construct a cross-sectional panel by averaging variables over the period 1980-
2004. The initial industry share is constructed using the earliest available data for
industry share, doing this we expand the sample of the countries since not all countries
report the data for 1980.
In order to test our main hypothesis on the di¤erentiated impact of nancial de-
velopment across industries, we borrow the notion of contract-intensive (institutionally
intensive) sectors from the recent trade literature on incomplete contracts and com-
parative advantage (Nunn 2007, Levchenko 2007). Following Nunn (2007), we rely on
the variable contract intensity that measures for every industry the proportion of in-
termediate inputs requiring relationship-specic investment. Based on the classication
by Rauch (1999), these inputs neither can be sold on an organized exchange nor are
reference priced in trade publications.10 The intuition behind this empirical proxy for
the severity of the holdup problem is simple. The non-existence of exchange or refer-
ence price suggests some non-standard feature of the product. If a producer requires
a non-standardized intermediate good for the production, the supplier has to under-
take ex ante investment in order to customize it. The value of such specic input is
thus higher inside the buyer-seller relationship than outside it, resulting in the holdup
problem. Moreover, in the absence of organized exchange or reference price the supplier
might have a hard time to sell her product at the original price should the initial buyer
10Rauch (1999) classies SITC Rev. 2 industries according to three possible types of its nal good:
di¤erentiated, reference priced and homogeneous. Naturally, the nal good of an industry can serve as
intermediate input for other industries.
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refuse to pay. Given that the original measure in Nunn (2007) is reported for I-O 1997
industry classication, we use the measure of contract intensity from Levchenko (2008)
who recomputes it for the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 classication.
The second industry characteristics we use is the measure of external nance depen-
dence introduced by Rajan and Zingales (1998). It is dened as capital expenditure
minus cash ow divided by capital expenditure. The original variable from Rajan and
Zingales (1998) is calculated for a mix of three-digit and four-digit ISIC industries. The
version of the measure used in our paper comes from Laeven et al. (2002) and follows
the 3-digit ISIC Revision 2 classication.
The data for nancial development is taken from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Levine
(2000) database that contains various indicators of nancial development across coun-
tries and over time. In our analysis, we use two proxies for nancial development:
private credit to GDP and stock market capitalization to GDP, the standard proxies for
nancial development used in the empirical literature.
The data for quality of legal institutions, the "rule of law", is taken from the database
constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). This variable is the weighted
average of several variables that measure perceived e¤ectiveness and predictability of
the judicial system and contract enforcement in each country. For our analysis we use
data for 1996 which is the earliest available estimate for this variable.
For instrumental variable regressions, we rely on the data of legal origin from Glaeser
et al. (2004). Legal origins are essentially indicator variables. For example, the common
law variable equals one for countries whose legal origin is the British common law and
zero otherwise. The remaining legal origins include French civil law, German civil law
and Socialist law. The omitted variable is Scandinavian civil law.
In the Appendix C and D we present data sources as well as summary statistics
for the international data we use in our analysis. Appendix E presents the correlation
matrix for the explanatory variables used in the cross-country context.
2.2.2 Sample of U.S. States
The dates of branch deregulation in di¤erent U.S. states are taken from Strahan (2003).
In the majority of states, bank deregulation occurred in two successive stages. The rst
stage of deregulation happened when the restriction of intrastate branching via merging
and acquisition (M&A) was abandoned, the second stage of deregulation occurred when
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overall restrictions on intrastate branching were removed. Since the time span between
these dates is relatively short it is di¢ cult to disentangle their e¤ects. Following the
literature, we focus on the deregulation of M&A branching when constructing the
deregulation dummy.
The data on the Gross State Product for the U.S. states are taken from the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA) and are reported according to US SIC industry classication,
in current dollars. We transform these data into real dollars using states price deator.
We restrict our sample to the period from 1978 till 1992 in accordance with the empirical
literature on the bank deregulation in the USA.11
Nunn (2007) computes his contract intensity measure for NAICS1997 industries,
while the manufacturing data from BEA are reported according to the 2digit SIC1972
classication. We aggregate contract intensity from Nunn (2007) over ranges of indus-
tries belonging to the same 2digit SIC1972 category using the concordance tables from
NAICS1997 to SIC1987 and from SIC1987 to SIC1972.12
As a measure for state courtsquality we use data from the State Liabilities Ranking
Study conducted for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce by Harris Intercative Inc. To our
knowledge this annual survey (2001-2008) is the only U.S.-wide study of state courts
quality.13 Kahan (2006) argues that the overall ranking of state courts is reasonable
constant over time. When estimating specication 3, we address the issue of possible
signicant shifts in ranking and use the "overall state grade" from both the studys rst
and last year.
3 International Evidence
3.1 OLS Estimation: Banks versus Stock Markets
Table 1 reports the results of estimating equation (1) using OLS. The dependent variable
is the average output growth for each industry and country. In all regressions we include
11The data on quantity index that is used to calculate price deator is available starting from 1977.
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) use data for Gross State Product from 1978-1992.
12The concordance tables are from Jon Havemans webpage:
http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/Trade.Resources/tradeconcordances.html
13The ranking is based on interviews with senior litigators about timeliness of summary judg-
ment/dismissal, judgesimpartiality and competence, juriespredictability and fairness etc. For details
see Kahan (2006) or http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com.
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country and industry dummies, so the overall e¤ect of initial nancial development is
absorbed by country dummies. The rst column of Table 1 reports the estimation
results of our baseline specication which includes the industrys share of total GDP
at the beginning of the sample period and the interaction term of contract intensity
and initial level of nancial development. Following our theoretical motivation we use
the ratio of private credit by banks to GDP as proxy for nancial development. The
estimated coe¢ cient for the interaction term is positive and statistically signicant at
a one percent level. This corroborates the hypothesis that a strong banking sector
promotes especially industries dependent on the relationship-specic investment of their
suppliers. The initial industry share has the expected negative sign, conrming the idea
that more mature industries with a high share in countrys GDP have less scope for
further growth.
The estimated relationship between nancial development and output growth is not
only statistically signicant but also economically relevant. According to the estimate
from the rst column of Table 1, if Mexicos bank credit to GDP ratio reached the
average OECD level, then the growth in manufacturing of "professional & scientic
equipment" would increase by 5%. 14
The subsequent columns present the regression results with an augmented set of ex-
planatory variables. Columns 2 and 3 control for alternative country-industry economic
channels which already found considerable empirical support and might be correlated
with our mechanism. In the second column we include an interaction term of the con-
tract intensity measure with institutional quality proxied by the rule of law. Financial
development might be correlated with legal and contracting institutions. In such case
our variable of interest would also capture the e¤ect of superior institutions on the
contract-intensive industries. Here we explicitly account for the channel examined in
the recent trade literature (Nunn 2007, Levchenko 2007): the industries with a high
share of relationship-specic inputs benet disproportionately from a good contracting
environment. In the third column we add the interaction term of industrys dependence
on external nance and countrys nancial development. Contract-intensive industries
might as well be the industries that require larger external funds to support their op-
14This is calculated as follows. Mexicos ratio of private credit to GDP is 0.16 and OECD average is
0.532. The coe¢ cient of the interaction term is 0.169. If Mexicos nancial development reached the
level of OECD average, then the growth rate in the "professional and scientic equipment" industry
would increase by:   4pcrdGDP  CI = 0:169:  (0:532  0:169)  0:785  5%
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erations. If so, then our variable of interest would also capture the benecial e¤ect
of nancial development on the industries dependent on external nance (Rajan and
Zingales 1998). In both augmented specications our variable of interest maintains a
positive and statistically signicant coe¢ cient. The coe¢ cients for the two other inter-
actions while positive, fail to have statistically signicant e¤ect.
In the last three columns we test the hypothesis about the singular role of banks
as promoters of industries requiring relationship-specic investment from their suppli-
ers. Country level studies document a positive e¤ect of both bank and stock market
development on long run economic growth (Levine and Zervos 1998). Our mechanism,
however, depends crucially on the unique capacity of relationship lending - via special-
ized bank products, reputation signalling or increase in the borrowersplanning horizon
- to reassure the sellers of relationship-specic inputs. The regressions in columns 4 to
6 mirror the estimation of the previous three columns, but add the interaction terms
of stock market capitalization over GDP with industry characteristics into the set of
explanatory variables. The coe¢ cient for the interaction term of private credit to GDP
remains positive and statistically signicant at 1% level. The interaction term of the
stock market capitalization to GDP with the contract intensity measure is never signif-
icant and even enters the regressions with a negative sign.15 The results conrm the
dominance of banks over anonymous stock markets in fostering the industries requiring
relationship-specic investment from their suppliers. Given the clear outcome of this
horse-race we focus on the banking sector in the rest of the paper.
3.2 Instrumental Variables Estimation
The results of the OLS estimation cannot be taken as conclusive evidence for our main
hypothesis due to the possibility of reverse causality a¤ecting both country character-
istics used in previous regressions. If industries requiring a high share of relationship-
specic inputs contribute disproportionately to overall economic growth, the country
might have stronger incentives to invest into nancial and institutional development.
To take care of this potential endogeneity problem, we use countrieslegal origins as our
instrumental variables, following the existing literature.16 Specically, we instrument
15We also run estimations with other proxies for nancial development such as stock market turnover
or stock value traded. The results are qualitatively similar and are available upon request.
16La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) show that the origin of the legal system a¤ects investor protection and
nancial development. Djankov et al. (2003) nd that legal origin has an impact on judicial quality
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the interaction terms of country characteristics (nancial development, rule of law) and
industry characteristics (importance of relationship-specic inputs, dependence on ex-
ternal nance) by the interaction terms of latter variables with legal origin dummies.
Table 2 presents results of the instrumental variable (GMM) estimation of equation
(1). The rst three columns are the GMM analogue for the rst three columns from
Table 1. The coe¢ cient for the interaction term of the contract intensity measure and
private credit to GDP remains positive and signicant at least at 5% level in all three
specications. The coe¢ cient for the rule of law interaction becomes signicant at
5% level as well, suggesting that contract-intensive industries benets from both legal
and nancial development. The interaction term of external nance dependence and
nancial development remains positive but insignicant after instrumentation.
At the bottom of Table 2, we report the weak instrument test suggested by Stock
and Yogo (2002), the partial R-squared measure suggested by Shea (1997) and the Sar-
gan/Hansen test of overindentifying restrictions. The rst stage statistics conrm that
our excluded instruments are highly correlated with the endogenous variables. The F
statistics from the rst stage regressions are mostly above 26. The somewhat lower
value for the third specication is probably due to the higher number of instruments.17
However, it is still above the rule of thumb value of 10 proposed by Yogo and Stock.
We also report the Cragg-Donald statistic suggested by Stock and Yogo in the pres-
ence of several endogenous regressors.18 Both tests reject the null hypothesis of weak
instruments. The Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions checks the validity
of the instruments: the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term under the null
hypothesis. The test rejects this null hypothesis at 10% level of signicance in two out
of three specications, implying that our set of instruments does not satisfy the required
orthogonality condition. Some of the instruments might be either not truly exogenous
or incorrectly excluded from the regression.
Legal origin can inuence di¤erent spheres of economic and political life of the coun-
and contract enforcement.
17Notice that we instrument every endogenous interaction term by appropriate interactions of indus-
try characteristics and legal origins dummies. In this way we want to properly control for theoretical
mechanisms di¤erent from ours. This cautious approach increases the number of instruments from
four to eight when controlling for the Rajan and Zingales (1998) channel: multiplicative terms of le-
gal dummies with external nance dependence add to the interactions of contract intensity and legal
origins.
18The critical values of the Cragg-Donald statistics are tabulated in Stock and Yogo (2002).
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try which might pose problems when using it as instrument. In our case the nancial
and institutional development are highly correlated with the overall economic progress.
For example, the sectors with a high share of relationship-specic inputs might also
require a disproportionate share of skilled labour or modern technologies. The contract-
intensive sectors might then grow faster in developed countries that happen to be rich
in human capital and operate on the technological frontier. We could include additional
interactions in our instrumental variable estimation, but it would be extremely di¢ -
cult to control for all possible channels. There might always be some other unobserved
characteristic of developed countries generating a higher growth in the sectors relying
on relationship-specic investments from their suppliers. To take care of this problem,
we add the interaction terms of the industry dummies with the log of real income per
worker into regression equation. The overall economic development can now a¤ect each
sector in an unrestricted way via those interactions. We thus explicitly control for the
possibility that developed countries have some (possibly unobservable) features that
facilitate growth in contract-intensive industries.19
We report the results of the GMM estimation with industry dummies interactions in
columns (4), (5) and (6) of Table 2. Comparing these last three columns with columns
(1)-(3) documents the robustness of our mechanism to this more stringent specica-
tion. The coe¢ cient for our variable of interest slightly decreases in the presence of
industry dummies interactions, but remains positive and signicant. In contrast, the
coe¢ cient for the interaction term of rule of law and contract intensity becomes in-
signicant and the external nance dependence interaction has now a negative sign.
The Sargan/Hansen statistics clearly improves: now we cannot reject the null hypothe-
sis of instruments validity at a 10 % level of signicance in two out of three specications.
The negative result for Sargan/Hansen test in the last column suggests problems with
the set of additional instruments controlling for the channel of dependence on external
nance (see footnote 17).
19Levchenko (2007) uses the interaction terms of industry dummies and economic development while
refraining from the use of instrumental variables. Nunn (2007) relies on legal origins as instruments
for institutional quality, but does not include the industry dummies interactions in the IV regressions.
Here we combine both approaches.
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3.3 Decomposing BanksPro-Growth E¤ect
So far we provided evidence that a well-developed banking system plays an important
role in promoting the sectors requiring relationship-specic investments from their sup-
pliers. In this section we study in more detail the specic channels through which this
link between banks and the real economy operates. We implement two decompositions
of the overall output growth. First, we examine whether our mechanism works rather
on the extensive margin (via increased entry of new rms) or on the intensive margin
(via accelerated growth of existing rms). Then we carry out a standard growth ac-
counting exercise testing whether the overall growth a¤ect comes from higher capital
accumulation, increased employment or faster technological progress (TFP growth).
Tables 3 and 4 isolate the extensive and the intensive margin of output growth.
The dependent variables are average growth in number of establishments (Table 3) and
average growth per establishment (Table 4). The rst three columns correspond to
the OLS regressions from the rst three columns of Table 1, the following six columns
mirror the instrumental variable (GMM) estimation of Table 2. Columns (4) to (6)
present the baseline GMM estimation and the last three columns include the interaction
terms of industry dummies with GDP per worker. The results provide clear evidence
for the extensive margin to be the driving force behind the positive e¤ect of a strong
bank system on the sectors with a high share of relationship-specic inputs. In Table
3, our variable of interest is always positive and statistically signicant. In the case of
the intensive margin (Table 4), the disproportionate positive impact of private credit
over GDP on the growth of contract intensive industries is statistically signicant only
in two out of nine specications. Especially, there is no signicant e¤ect once we control
for the endogeneity of nancial development (columns three to nine).
These results suggest that banks facilitate the creation of new rms in contract-
intensive industries rather than helping the existing companies to expand. This is in
line with the signalling channel by Fama (1985). A new rm with no existing record
of fullling its commitment will face more wariness from the suppliers of relationship-
specic inputs. Consequently, it will be heavily dependent on credible signals about
its nancial stability that arise from a successfully obtained bank loan. In contrast, an
existing rm has usually already established a stable network of suppliers. It can thus
rely more on its own reputation and familiarity with its business partners and less on
reputational signals from third parties like banks.
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Next, we analyze the e¤ect of nancial development on sectors with a high share
of relationship-specic inputs within the growth accounting framework. In order to do
so, we reconstruct capital stock using the standard methodology employed by Hall and
Jones (1999) and TFP using the methodology of Solow (1957). Appendix B provides
details of the procedure. Tables 5 to 7 summarize the outcome of this second channel
decomposition. The dependent variables are average growth of capital (Table 5), average
growth in employment (Table 6) and average TFP growth (Table 7). Again, the rst
three columns report the OLS estimations, the following three present the results of the
baseline GMM estimation and the last three columns report the results of the GMM
estimation augmented with the industry dummies interactions.
The growth accounting suggests a higher capital accumulation as the most important
source of the banking sectors benecial impact on the industries relying on relationship-
specic investment from their suppliers. After correcting for endogeneity of nancial de-
velopment in columns (4) to (9) of Table 5, the positive e¤ect of private credit on capital
growth in the contract-intensive industries becomes highly statistically signicant. This
result provides empirical support for the theoretical channel proposed by von Thadden
(1995). A higher capital accumulation would be a rst-order implication of a theoretical
mechanism working through bank loans attenuating the short-term investment bias and
increasing the rmsplanning horizon.
We have less clear-cut evidence for a positive role of the banking system in boosting
employment in industries with a high share of relationship-specic inputs. In Table 6 the
estimated coe¢ cient for our main variable of interest is always positive and mostly sig-
nicant. Still, the relationship between nancial development and employment growth
in the contract-intensive industries appears less robust than in the case of capital accu-
mulation.
There is no evidence that the banking system promotes economic growth via pro-
ductivity growth in the sectors dependent on relationship-specic investment from their
suppliers. Table 7 presents the estimation results with TFP growth as a dependent
variable. The results in the rst three columns show the interaction term of private
credit and contract intensity entering the OLS regressions at the 10% level of signi-
cance. Once we control for endogeneity (last six columns), this signicance disappears
and sometimes the main variable enters with the negative sign.
Overall, the two decompositions performed in this section suggest that a strong
18
banking system promotes the industries with a high share of relationship-specic inputs
mainly via increased entry of new rms and higher capital accumulation. Those results
conrm the empirical relevance of the theoretical channels emphasizing bank loans as a
signalling device (Fama 1985) and as a source of long-term investment planning horizon
for the rms (von Thadden 1995).
4 Evidence from U.S. Branch Deregulation
The analysis based on international data suggests that nancial development particularly
promotes industries dependent on relationship-specic investments from their suppliers.
In order to further investigate this issue we check our prediction using data from the U.S.
branch deregulation. The banking industry experienced signicant changes after the
states removed the restrictions governing the geographical scope of banking operations.
The banking sector consolidated as large bank holding companies acquired banks and
converted existing bank subsidiaries into branches. Small banks lost market share and
regional bank markets experienced signicant entry of new banks. These changes in the
banking sector became the source of an improved e¢ ciency of the banking sector. The
consolidation and the entry of new banks provided an important selection mechanism to
replace less e¢ cient banks. The formation of larger bank organizations allowed to explore
economies of scale and to gain a better diversication via an expansion of the branch
network. The average costs of intermediation decreased via better loan monitoring and
screening. All these changes translated into overall higher growth of the real sectors of
the economy (see e.g. Jayaratne and Strahan 1996, Kroszner and Strahan 1999, Black
and Strahan 2002, Strahan 2003).
As the branch deregulation led not only to a more e¢ cient but also to a more
consolidated banking sector, its impact on contract-intensive industries is theoretically
ambiguous. The increased quality of surviving banks should benet industries that
heavily depend on the quality of bank services.20 The direct e¤ects of bank competition
20Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) analyze the quality of bank loans before and after deregulation. They
show that intrastate deregulation improves the quality of bank loan portfolios. In addition, they show
that the quantity of loans granted to "insiders" (corporate executive, principal shareholders) decreases
signicantly after the branching reform. The improvement in bank loans after deregulation and the lack
of a consistent increase in lending after the branch reform suggest that bank monitoring and screening
improvement are the key to the observed growth increases.
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and consolidation are not that clear-cut. On the one hand, contract-intensive industries
may rely on specic long-term relationships with regional banks. The knowledge of
the industries should allow local banks to provide ne-tuned banking services to their
customers. Branch deregulation decreases the monopoly power of local banks and may
therefore destroy their incentive to forge long term relationships with local businesses.
Petersen and Rajan (1995) develop a model in which the market power of banks helps
new businesses. Monopolistic banks can subsidize borrowers during some periods be-
cause they can extract rents during other times. In competitive markets, however, rms
have access to alternative sources of credit. Here banks cannot o¤er low prices early on
as they lack the market power to recover those investments later. On the other hand,
Boot and Thakor (2000) argue that bank competition may raise the rewards for activi-
ties that allow to di¤erentiate themselves from other lenders, which raise the incentive
to invest in relationships with borrowers.
The empirical results are mixed as well. Black and Strahan (2002) show that branch
deregulation benets new rms that traditionally depend on relationship lending. They
nd that the rate of new incorporations in an average state increased signicantly after
deregulation. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) nd that industries dependent on external
nance grow faster in countries with a more concentrated banking system than they do
in countries with a more open and competitive banking sector. The papers examining
the e¤ect of banking consolidation on the lending to small businesses have also come to
contradictory conclusions (see Black and Strahan 2002 and references therein).
Similarly to small and new enterprises, the rms in contract-intensive industries also
disproportionately depend on a committed long-term relationship with their bank. In
this context a pro-growth e¤ect of branch deregulation on contract-intensive industries
would suggest an overall positive e¤ect of increased bank competition on relationship
lending.
Table 8 presents the estimation results for the sample of U.S. states. Our variable
of interest is the interaction term of the branch deregulation dummy with the contract
intensity measure. In all specications we include the initial share of the industry in
the state manufacturing output to capture the convergence e¤ect. We also control for
overall economic growth in a given state and year. The standard errors are clustered by
state. The rst column reports the results of estimating equation 2 with the full set of
state, industry and time xed e¤ects. The coe¢ cient for the main variable is positive
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but signicant only at 15% level. This lower level of signicance is not surprising given
the mixed theoretical and empirical results about the impact of branch deregulation on
rms reliant upon relationship lending.
The next four columns report the estimation results for equation 3. This specication
allows to examine whether bank deregulation and the quality of state courts act as
substitutes or complements in stimulating relationship-specic investment. The second
column adds two interaction terms containing the state courtsquality from the year
2001, while adopting the set of xed e¤ects from column (1). Both bank deregulation and
superior state courts have a positive and signicant e¤ect on the growth of contract-
intensive industries. Furthermore, the signicantly negative coe¢ cient for the triple
interaction term suggests substitutability between strong banks and legal quality in
reassuring the rms undertaking relationship-specic investment.
A possible concern within the Rajan-Zingales framework is the omission of alterna-
tive growth channels working through various country and industry characteristics that
are correlated with included interaction terms. In our international sample we controlled
for this possibility by interacting the industry dummies with the log of real income per
worker. The three-dimensional panel of the U.S. states allows for a more stringent
specication by adding a full set of state-industry xed e¤ects into the regression. This
controls for possible interactions between di¤erent state and industry characteristics that
might be correlated with our channel. Column (3) reports the results. Both the posi-
tive e¤ect of bank deregulation on contract intensive industries and the substitutability
between banking and legal channel are still present. The state-industry xed e¤ects
now capture the impact of state courtsquality on the industries with a high share of
relationship-specic inputs.
Another concern relates to possible changes of legal quality over time. Columns (4)
and (5) repeat the estimation of the previous two columns using the most recent data
for the quality of state courts from the year 2008. The results are qualitatively the same.
5 Conclusion
Several prominent papers (Klein et al. 1978, Williamson 1979, Grossman and Hart
1986, Hart and Moore 1990) argue that a rational agent (e.g. upstream supplier) tends
to underinvest in relationship-specic assets as she will eventually face opportunistic
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actions from her contractual partner (downstream purchaser). A legally binding con-
tract between the two parties is the standard proposal to alleviate the adverse eco-
nomic consequences of this holdup problem. The recent trade literature (Nunn 2007,
Levchenko 2007) builds upon this insight and demonstrates the benecial impact of
contract-enforcing institutions on sectors with a high share of relationship-specic in-
puts. The empirical results in this paper suggest that nancial development might
be at least equally important for the economic performance of such contract-intensive
industries.21 A well-developed banking sector seems especially important in this regard.
This is not to say that institutions do not play a potentially important role in the
development of industries requiring relationship-specic investments from their suppli-
ers. First, bank products suitable for reassuring the producers of relationship-specic
inputs often require a functioning legal system. The letter of credit would be a primary
example. One might thus view institutional quality and strong banking sector as com-
plements, rather than substitutes. Our results from the sample of U.S. states suggest
the prevalence of substitution forces in the case of a highly developed country. However,
one could suspect a stronger complementarity between a vigorous banking sector and a
functioning legal system in countries at lower stages of development.
Second, an inuential strand of literature (e.g. Levine et al. 2000) argues that good
institutions including contract enforcement can boost nancial development. Thus,
one possible interpretation of our results would be that superior institutions promote
investments into relationship-specic assets indirectly via their positive impact on the
level of nancial development.
Needless to say, much more work is needed to disentangle the e¤ects of nance and
institutions on industries using relationship-specic inputs. For one thing, there is an
issue of possible nonlinearities between contract enforcement and nance, briey raised
by Levine et al. (2000). The theoretical literature explains the very existence of nancial
intermediaries as the consequence of market imperfections (e.g. Boyd and Prescott
1985). In a world with perfect contract enforcement, there would be less reasons to
have nancial intermediaries in the rst place. Moreover, various deep determinants of
21To be precise, the results of this paper are not directly comparable with those in the trade literature.
Our dependent variable is the growth of industrial output, while Nunn (2007) and Levchenko (2007)
focus on the export performance of industries. This is important as our channel seems to work mostly
via the extensive margin (increased entry of new rms). Arguably, the export performace of an industry
relies mostly on older established rms.
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economic growth like culture or human capital can drive both nancial and institutional
development. We leave those issues for further research.
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Appendix A: Countries in the International Sample
Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Bangladesh; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana;
Brazil; Bulgaria; Cameroon; Canada; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cote dIvoire;
Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Ethiopia; Finland;
France; Gabon; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; Honduras; Hong Kong; Hungary; Iceland;
India; Indonesia; Iran; Ireland; Israel; Italy; Japan; Jordan; Kenya; Korea(republic
of); Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Macao; Malawi; Malaysia; Malta; Mau-
ritius; Mexico; Moldova; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Nepal; Netherlands; New
Zealand; Nigeria; Norway; Oman; Pakistan; Panama; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Por-
tugal; Qatar; Romania; Russia; Senegal; Singapore; Slovak Republic; Slovenia; South
Africa; Spain; Sri Lanka; Sweden; Switzerland; Tanzania; Thailand; Trinidad &Tobago;
Tunisia; Turkey; United Kingdom; United States; Uruguay; Venezuela; Yemen
Appendix B: Reconstructing Capital Stock and Total Factor Productivity
The capital stock in each year t is given by:
Kict = (1  )Kict 1 + Iict
We use a depreciation rate  = 0:08, and use the standard assumption that initial
level of capital stock is equal to:
Kic0 =
Iic0

We compute total factor productivity at the industry level using the following for-
mula:
lnTFPict = lnYict   (1  ic) lnKict   ic lnLict
where Yict is the total output, Kict is the capital stock and Lict is the total employ-
ment in the sector.
The ic is computed as the average of the total wage bill divided by value added for
sector i for the US data,22 this will allow us to avoid unduly reduction in our sample to
the countries that have available data for value added and wage payment.
22Levchenko, Ranciere and Thoening (2008) who use similiar database to analyze the e¤ect of nacial
liberization on industry growth show that results do not change if a countryaverage labor share of
sector i is used instead.
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